In an interesting blog post, Liam Kofi Bright argues that standpoint epistemology is implied by the basic commitments of empiricism. In what follows, I argue that this is an error.
Kofi Bright’s characterization of standpoint epistemology involves three propositions:
(1) Knowledge is socially situated. (2) Marginalized groups are socially situated in ways that make it more possible for them to be aware of things and ask questions than it is for the non-marginalized. (3) Research, particularly that focused on power relations, should begin with the lives of the marginalized.
He begins with a simple thought experiment: suppose that one half of a caste system works each day on the factory floor, the other half in the offices, and nobody ever switches. An empiricist would, he points out, approach the first group, if knowledge about factory floors is sought (and the second if knowledge of the workings of office buildings is sought). Accordingly, in such a world there is “a clear sense in which knowledge would be socially situated”.
After adding the assumption that factory workers are worse off than the office workers, so that they constitute a marginalized group, Kofi Bright concludes:
What is more, for at least some things… the marginalised are clearly in a better position to know what's going on and ask pertinent questions, for just the same reason as above.
What is unclear is why there is “more”. What exactly does marginalization add, epistemically? Kofi Bright has thus far argued that factory workers know more than office workers about how factories operate simply on account of their social situation, which as an empiricist must mean because the experiences provided by their work in factories are not available to the office workers. That’s proposition (1). But how does adding the assumption that factory workers are worse off lead to (2), especially when the conclusion is based on “just the same reason as above”? How does the fact that one position is better than the other at gaining knowledge of factory work, because it involves factory work, lead to the conclusion that marginalization is a further epistemic advantage?
This part of the argument is based on the premise that the marginalized caste has more to be concerned about, such as “the orders telegraphed in from the office blocks, which they have every reason to pay attention to lest the food rations cease”. The idea is that if one must worry about orders from the office blocks, on pain of starvation, then this will keep one sharper and more focused on the relationship between the castes in comparison to those who are not subject to such pressure.
Let me note, to begin, that the suggestion that fear causes the mind to sharpen and focus, rather than dull and blur, is not a tenet of empiricism but is in fact an empirical proposition concerning human psychology. It may very well be true, of course, but it does not follow from empiricism (which is an a priori philosophical theory), so if the empiricist believes it, s/he ought to base that belief on the empirical evidence in its favour. Accordingly, it is this evidence that has to be taken to favour (2), not (1) nor empiricism itself, which as a philosophical commitment must remain neutral on this question, at least so far as it offers up a priori arguments.
In fact, this point cuts a bit more deeply. For, in order to comply with (1), empiricist standpoint theory must insist that it is the social psychologists, not empiricist philosophers, who are best placed to know of the relationship between social conditions, such as oppression, and psychological states such as belief (I assume beliefs are necessary for knowledge). Moreover, the typical empiricist would agree, I suppose, that these psychologists must do more than haphazardly observe factory-office interaction, and then draw whatever conclusions occur to them off the top of their heads. Rather, they need to engage in the proper selection and collection of data followed by appropriate scientific analysis, such as statistical tests, comparison against established theories, etc.; in short, reasoning their way toward a conclusion. So, it is not simple observation of factory-office relationships, but the proper application of scientific methodologies to properly attuned observation, that leads to knowledge of the power relations in play. After all, psychologists can make mistakes and occasionally have to retract or modify their conclusions (which is just to say that proper reasoning is required). Accordingly, social situatedness does not lead straight to knowledge. What is required is the proper gathering of evidence combined with good empirical analysis. So, as a matter of a priori philosophical argument, the question of the relationship between a particular social situation, such as ‘factory worker’, and a particular knowledge claim remains open.
The only way to resist this conclusion is to insist that the epistemic advantage enjoyed by the social psychologists (who properly apply the scientific tools that allow for correct inferences from properly collected data) just is their social position; so it really is social position that holds knowledge even in this case. This, however, is simply to beg the question because it builds epistemic mastery into the definition of a social position. In other words, what makes knowledge reside in a social position here is the fact that a particular social group has better epistemic tools than its competitors. But even a rationalist foundationalist can agree that S is epistemically privileged if and only if S is epistemically better than its rivals: this is trivial. So, empiricism implies standpoint theory either on the basis of synthetic a priori claims, or else by trivializing it.
A part of Kofi Bright’s argument refers to incentives:
…if you had limited time and resources to interview people and find out about race relations in some town in 1947 Alabama, which group do you think [you] should spend more time getting to know, should you want to include in the research team… I take it that an empiricist, somebody who thinks that knowledge tracks degree of experience and incentive to really think things through, is going to want to favour the marginalised group here.
What is important to note here is that this implies that it is not the mere existence of incentives that epistemically advantages a social group but, instead, the fact that the incentives lead the members of the group to reason better, to “think things through”. However, the incentive to think better does not always lead to better thinking. A highly motivated lover of physics, who wants desperately to prove his intellectual worth, may enter a Ph.D. program, work hard, and nevertheless graduate with less knowledge of physics than his disengaged, wealthy classmate who has no real interest in physics but wants to pass the time until her trust fund matures and who happens to be a mathematical prodigy who easily masters physics at the highest levels.
In general, incentive is a necessary condition for achievement, not a sufficient condition. After all, who has more incentive to redress persistent economic inequality in western societies than the marginalized? That incentive has not led to increased equality over the past fifty years. In fact, inequality has worsened over that time. The fact is that marginalized people need more than incentive to fight inequality; they need the means to do so. The powerful are happy with our current distribution of wealth, so they ensure that roadblocks to change exist. Overcoming roadblocks requires more than incentive and, of course, the world is filled with roadblocks on the path to knowledge.
So, it is not mere incentive that provides someone with epistemic advantage but, rather, the combination of the incentive with the skill and opportunity to both learn more than others and to succeed in doing so. What this means is that before we can determine whether social position is epistemically relevant, and if so how, we need to know which tools best serve in gaining knowledge and how they should be applied. In other words, we need to determine the proper standards of evidence and reasoning before we can assess the epistemic status of a social group. But this is just to say that standpoint theory is false. So I disagree with Kofi Bright when he asserts that empiricism’s implication of standpoint theory is obvious, “really quite a banal point”. I think, on the contrary, that empiricism is incompatible with standpoint theory.
Let me conclude with an example. To this day, here are those who study and immerse themselves in astrological writing, theory, and practice and who take themselves to have a great deal of knowledge concerning the relationship between celestial bodies and human affairs as a result. I disagree on the grounds that astrology is a false theory, based on Aristotelian teleology, which has no role in contemporary astronomy. What the demographic category ‘astrologer’ amounts to, or what demographic groups astrologers occupy, is simply irrelevant; what I care about is whether they are applying correct physical models properly. It is the thinking, not the social position, that matters.
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